A different approach is introduced to determine the value of an information sharing agreement: the measure of risk aversion. (An information sharing agreement is a commitment to reveal information that you are going to receive. These agreements are common within industries.) This approach is natural as the work in risk is partly based on Blackwell's work in experimentation, a measure of information and its value. This different approach has four main benefits. First, the relationship between information sharing models and the extensive literature in risk is made explicit. Second, the approach here is more general than previous models of information sharing as there are fewer restrictions on the distribution of the unknown parameter and the information. Third, this generality enables me to extend the model to include uncertainty regarding the slope of the demand which previous work eschews. Finally, I find that the incentive to reveal information may be more prevalent than previously thought: firms prefer to commit to reveal private valued information in both quantity and price competition. This result differs from previous work where the incentive to commit depended on the type of competition.
